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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis lays the foundation for the Intelligence Module of the AIRLAND
RESEARCH MODEL (ALARM). It examines the relationship between the
Intelligence Module and the other modules of ALARM. Specifically it develops the
the structure of the Intelligence Module to include the flow of combat information
from other modules, the fusion of combat information into tactical intelligence and the
subsequent dissemination of that intelligence. Additionally it proposes a
Lanchester-type formulation for target acquisition and presents a methodology to
estimate the required coefficients from the output of a high resolution combat
simulation. The thesis is organized as follows:
1. Review of the AirLand Battlefield and the AIRLAND RESEARCH MODEL
(ALARM).
2. Overview of the current tactical intelligence system of the U.S. Army.
3. Development of the Intelligence Module ofALARM.
4. Discussion of the functions of the Combat Intelligence Processor and
methodologies for implementing them.
5. Review of the Glimpse and Continuous-search models of target acquisition.
6. Modeling target acquisition using a Lanchester-type formulation.
7. Estimation of Lanchesterian coefficients using maximum likelihood estimators.
8. Illustration of the inter-relationships between the Intelligence, Execution and
Planning Modules ofALARM using a worked example.
9. Discussion of areas requiring additional research/study.
The thesis is concerned with modeling the tactical intelligence system of the
United States ground forces at the corps level and below. It concentrates on U.S. Army
forces employed in the European Theater against Soviet forces. Models o[ the Soviet
tactical intelligence system will not be explored. However, it is anticipated that many of
the basic constructs developed in this thesis can be applied with a minimum of
modification in future studies. Similarly the acquisition of combat information by U.S.
Air Force assets will be addressed in the research being done on the Air Force
sub-module of ALARM. Finally, although an important source of combat information
and intelligence, echelons above corps are not specifically addressed in this thesis.
Before continuing with the development of the Intelligence Module the
characteristics of the AirLand Battlefield are examined and the structure of the
AIRLAND RESEARCH MODEL, as currently envisioned, is reviewed.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD
The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 [Ref. l:pp. 1-1,1-2] lists eight characteristics
that will distinguish the airland battlefield:
1. Nonlinear Maneuver Battles - The U.S. Army will face enemy forces which are
highly mechanized and possess very sophisticated and lethal weapon systems.
The enemy forces will integrate armored ground forces with air power and the
potential use of nuclear/chemical weapons. Both sides will be able to rapidly
mass troops and fires in order to achieve penetrations. As a result distinct lines




2. Lethal Systems - Both the U.S. and enemy forces will possess weapons of high
quality and lethality. The coordinated use of air and ground precision guided
munitions will allow the concentration of combat power at critical points on the
battlefield.
3. Sensors and Communications. - The wide-spread availability of surveillance and
target acquisition sensors, coupled with an extensive communications system,
will allow rapid dissemination of combat information and tactical intelligence.
This will affect both the range and scope of the battle.
4. Nuclear and Chemical Warfare - The potential use of nuclear and / or chemical
weapons will drastically alter the battlefield. The threat of their use will preclude
the massing of troops, except for short periods. It is possible that tactical
nuclear weapons will come to dominate the battle and relatively small maneuver
forces will be used to exploit their effects. The tempo of the battlefield will
increase while the duration of specific battles will decrease.
5. Command and Control - Effective command and control will be a decisive
factor in future battles. Ironically, the vulnerability of communication systems
to electronic countermeasures may significantly degrade the commanders ability
to communicate with, and subsequently control, his forces at critical junctures
in the battle. Command and control facilities will be specifically targeted.
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6. Air Systems - The use of helicopters and tactical air power will extend the depth
of the battle. The effective use of air defense will become an important issue in
future battles.
7. Austere Support - Future battles will be fought at the end of long and
vulnerable supply lines. The ability of both sides to strike deep will hamper
resupply to the fighting forces. Additionally the nonlinear, maneuver oriented
battlefield will preclude the stockpiling of supplies in any great quantities.
8. Rear Area Combat - Support systems in the rear area will be the focus of
intense attacks intended to disrupt the flow of crucial supplies, replacements
and information. The goal will be to reduce the effectiveness of the fighting
forces by denying them needed support. Additionally, maneuver forces will be
siphoned from the main battle area in order to provide protection to rear area
support facilities.
These characteristics describe a battlefield which is potentially very different from
those of the recent past. New operational and tactical doctrines have been and are in
the process of being developed. These new doctrinal concepts are being explored using
field training exercises (FTX's), command-post exercises (CPX's), wargames and
computer simulations. Many of the combat models (computer simulations) which are
currently in use are modifications of dated models. ALARM is an attempt to explore
new methodology based on what is believed to the true nature of the modern
battlefield.
C. THE AIRLAND RESEARCH MODEL ( ALARM )
ALARM will be used initially to model the interdiction battle at the corps level
and below. The interdiction battle is the foundation of the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle
doctrine. Three primary purposes have been identified for ALARM [Ref. 2]:
1. The development of modeling methodology appropriate for the very large scale
but sparsely populated rear areas involved in the (non-FLOT) interdiction
battle, and for the command and control of the AirLand Battle force.
2. The application of these methodologies in the construction of a
simulation/wargaming model initially focusing on two-sided interdiction.
3. The eventual use of the model to perform research on the conduct of the total
AirLand Battle.
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The goal of the development effort is to produce a systemic model which will
allow for a detailed audit trail by which an analysis of the cause and effect relationships
can be conducted. ALARiM has the following unique features:
1. Systemic architecture which allows the model to conduct the simulation without
the- requirement for human intervention at critical decision points.
2. Rule-based decision systems in which the command and control (C ) functions
are automated, along with related processes.
3. A Network representation which uses a generalized network methodology and
multidimensional coordinate systems to represent terrain, transportation and
communication interconnections, and command and control relationships.
4. A Generalized Value System (GVS) which is the base concept for the future
state decision making featured in the model. The GVS assigns an initial value
to a combat unit based on the availability of weapons, personnel and supplies.
This initial value is then adjusted (discounted) to reflect the time delay that may
be required before the unit is in position to accomplish its assigned mission. The
initial values of logistic/support units and other battlefield entities are
determined primarily from their ability to increase the value of combat units.
Extensive research on the GVS has been conducted by Kilmer. [Ref. 3]
ALARM is a testbed for examining methodology; it is not a production model.
The proposed computer model of ALARM, as currently conceived, has three major
components: a Planning Module, an Execution Module and an Intelligence Module.
These modules are currently being developed. Figure 1.1 displays a simplified diagram
of the relationship between the three modules. The Planning Module includes the
decision algorithms and consists of several submodules. Figure 1.2 shows a division
planning sub-module in more detail. There is a planning sub-module for each
hierarchical level of the task force organization (battalion through corps), to include,
as required, associated sub-modules for indirect fire, engineering, logistics, U.S. Army
aviation, maintenance etc.
The planning sub-modules develop detailed plans for execution using decision
algorithms and available information from the Execution Module. Figure 1.3 displays
the stages in a planning sub-module for a single U.S. unit and the interaction between
the planning sub-module and the Execution xVIodule. Briefly, the unit receives the



































Figure 1.1 Modular Structure ofALARM.
operation and some specific directives for its implementation. Courses of action are
developed and feasibility checks conducted. A detailed plan of action is then prepared










































Figure 1.2 Division Planning Sub-Module.
are initially checked to insure that they conform to the commanders guidance. During
the execution, decision threshold parameters are monitored. Violation of a decision
threshold parameter may cause the planning cycle to be re-entered and the plan
14
modified. Current research is concentrating on developing the Planning Module, the









































Figure 1.3 Unit Planning.
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It is apparent that the Intelligence Module plays a key role in the interaction
between the Planning Module and the Execution Module. The Intelligence Module
receives raw data (combat information) concerning enemy forces and other model
entities from the Execution Module. It then must separate this information and pass it
along to the appropriate level in the Planning Module. For instance, during the
execution of a division operation it must determine what information should be made
available to each battalion and brigade planning sub-module (to include their related
support planning sub-modules). This availability of information may be a function of
the unit's location on the battlefield, task force organization, and unit composition and
strength. One important issue concerns whether this information should represent the
"ground truth" or some perceived truth. If the data is to be transformed, how should
this be accomplished ? This issue is addressed later in the thesis.
A second function of the Intelligence Module, which is not apparent from the
figures, is the preparation of an intelligence estimate. This intelligence estimate is an
integral part of the planning module. Thus each hierarchical level which possesses an
intelligence analysis capability has an intelligence sub-module associated with its
planning sub-module. These intelligence sub-modules are responsible for the fusion of
existing intelligence and combat information into a intelligence estimate which can be
used by the planning sub-module. The intelligence system and the development of a
model is addressed next.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE MODEL
A. AN OYERVIEW OF THE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM
The AirLand Battle concept of interdiction, or the deep battle, is extremely
dependent upon accurate and timely information about enemy units and battlefield
conditions. The tactical intelligence system is responsible for the collection and
evaluation of information the and dissemination of intelligence to the tactical decision
maker. First it is necessary to clarify the distinction between information, combat
information and tactical intelligence.
• Def: INFORMATION - unevaluated material including that derived from
observations, communications, reports, rumors, imagery or any other source. The
information may or may not be true, accurate and/ or even pertinent.
Information can also be negative in the sense that an event may have not
occurred, or that an item of interest is absent from the battlefield.
• Def: COMBAT INFORMATION - information upon which minimal verification
and validation has been conducted. It is characterized by being readily
exploitable, near real-time delivery from source to user, and used immediately for
tactical execution and fire support.
• Def: TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE - the product resulting from the collection,
evaluation and interpretation of information. The goal of tactical intelligence is
to minimize the uncertainty concerning the enemy's objectives, capabilities and
battlefield conditions which may effect the accomplishment of the mission. It is
characterized as all-source, complex and a result of detailed analysis. It is
delivered in hours, and used for planning.
The tactical intelligence system focuses the intelligence effort by delimiting
collection and evaluation responsibilities for each subordinate unit and by setting
priorities for information upon which collection is to be concentrated.
• Def: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI) - those critical
items of information about the enemy and battlefield needed by the commander
to assist him in reaching a logical decision. EEI are often time sensitive.
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EEI requirements are generally provided to the unit from its superior
headquarters. Additional EEI, which support its specific mission, may be developed by
the unit itself. Collection efforts are centered on satisfying these EEI requirements.
To further enhance the collection effort each tactical unit is assigned a
geographical' area for intelligence operations. This geographical area is subdivided into
an Area of Influence and an Area of Interest.
• Def: AREA OF INFLUENCE - that portion of the assigned area of operation in
which the commander can directly affect the course of the battle using his own
organic and supporting assets.
The actual area will vary in size depending upon the terrain, enemy capability
and disposition, and the unit's ability to react to enemy actions. The area is specified in
terms of time. Normally, a commander will possess the means for monitoring and
collecting combat information within the area of influence. Table 1 displays typical
area of influence assignments for various levels of command.
TABLE 1
TYPICAL AREAS OF INFLUENCE
Level of Time Beyond FLOT
command or Attack Objectives
Battalion up to 3 hours
Brigade up to 12 hours
Division up to 24 hours
Corps up to 72 hours
In addition to an area of influence each unit has an area of interest.
• Def: AREA OF INTEREST - includes the area of influence and extends beyond
and laterally to those areas in which enemy units or battlefield conditions are
capable of affecting a unit's mission in the near future.
Again the area of interest is specified in terms of time and assigned after
considering the terrain, enemy and the unit's status. Unlike the area of influence a unit
does not normally have the capability of monitoring its area of interest. Rather, the
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unit receives information about the area of interest primarily from higher and adjacent
units. Table 2 displays typical area of interest assignments for various levels of
command.
TABLE 2
TYPICAL AREAS OF INTEREST
Level of Time Beyond FLOT
Command or Attack Objectives
Battalion up to 12 hours
Brigade up to 24 hours
Division up to 72 hours
Corps up to 96 hours
Figure 2. 1 shows the inter-relationship of the areas of influence and interest for
a corps. The key feature is the stacking of the areas of influence and interest of a
subordinate unit within the area of influence of the next higher unit. Each unit is
responsible for collecting information within its area of influence. The means to do this
are the organic and supporting assets. The primary information collectors at each level
are detailed below:
• Battalion: Tank/Infantry companies, the scout platoon, ground surveillance radar
(GSR) sections, and artillery fire support teams (FIST) are the usual collectors.
• Brigade: Divisional brigades generally do not possess organic assets for the
collection of information. Rather, they task their subordinate battalions to
perform the required collection of information within the brigade's area of
influence.
• Division: In addition to subordinate brigades, the cavalry squadron, military
intelligence battalion, divisional artillery target acquisition units, NBC
reconnaissance platoon, air defence battalion and divisional engineer and aviation
units are the primary collectors.
• Corps: In addition to subordinate divisions and separate brigades the normal
collectors are armored cavalry regiments, artillery units, military intelligence
groups, aviation groups, engineers and adjacent corps.
19
Figure 2.1 Areas oflnterest and Influence.
20
Figure 2.2 is a simplified diagram of the flow of information, combat information
and intelligence into and out of a unit intelligence organization. Information flows into
the intelligence section from collectors which are operating in the unit's area of
influence. The intelligence section identifies combat information contained in the raw
information and passes this to the commander, associated staff elements, subordinate
units and the senior units intelligence section as appropriate. The intelligence section
also receives combat information from all of these same agencies. This combat
information is disseminated as required and, coupled with intelligence from the senior
headquarters, is used to prepare and update the intelligence estimate. This intelligence
estimate is essential to the commander and his staff in planning and conducting
operations.
Two unique features of the intelligence system are illustrated in Figure 2.2. First,
unlike combat information, intelligence only flows down the chain of command.
Subordinate units do not pass intelligence to senior units. This may seem like an
unreasonable constraint on the flow of critical information, but in reality it is merely
an artifice of the distinction between combat information and intelligence. Tactical
intelligence is combat information which has been processed and specifically tailored to
the unit's mission. It is necessarily limited in scope and contains suppositions about the
enemy. There actually tends to be a healthy, but unofficial, dialogue between
intelligence organizations about enemy capabilities and potential actions. The second
unique feature is that information does not flow exclusively into the intelligence
section. Information flows into the commander and the other staff sections of the unit.
This information receives minimal processing (verification/validation) and then enters
the intelligence system as combat information.
With this as a basis for understanding the tactical intelligence system, the next
step is to construct a model which replicates the functions and results of the system.
B. THE INTELLIGENCE MODULE
The architecture of the proposed Intelligence Module and its relationships with
the Planning Module and Execution Module is displayed in Figure 2.3 Notice that the
Planning Module is structured so that there is a sub-planning module for each
hierarchical level of the organization. The Intelligence Module is sub-divided along the
same lines. Associated with each sub-planning module is an intelligence sub-module.




























Figure 2.2 Information Flow.
Processor (CIP) and the Intelligence Estimate Processor (IEP). All information, both
friendly and enemy, is routed to a CIP. Updates in friendly unit status such as location
or strength, the destruction of a bridge and contact with an enemy unit are examples of





















































































Figure 2.3 ALARM Modules.
In order to illustrate the proposed model a typical item of combat information
will be traced through the system, in this case a sighting of a group of enemy tanks
reported by a battalion's GSR. Information from the Execution Module is tagged by
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the collector which is reporting the information. This collector is identified on the task
force hierarchical network as belonging to a particular unit. This task force tag is used
to route the information to the correct battalion CIP. In the CIP the incoming
information is compared to the current perceived data base. The CIP must determine if
the reported group of tanks is a first time sighting of a previously unknown enemy
unit, a redundant sighting which has been reported by another collector or an update
on an already known enemy unit. The method by which this checking is conducted and
the aggregation methodology are described in Chapter III.
Assume that in this specific instance the group of tanks is determined to be a
new target. The CIP updates the battalion's perceived data base by adding the enemy
tanks. This perceived data base is used both by the battalion's planning sub-module
and the IEP component of the battalion's intelligence sub-module. Additionally the
combat information concerning the tanks is passed to the CIPs of the battalion's
subordinate units and to the CIP of the next senior unit in the task force hierarchy. As
indicated in Figure 2.3 the combat information reported up and down the chain of
command may be filtered. In the downward flow of combat information this filtering
serves as a sieve. Aggregated information is broken down into blocks that are
appropriate for the level receiving the combat information. Conversely the filtering
serves to aggregate the combat information which is passed up the task force network.
Thus, for example, battalions would receive data on the location of platoons whereas
divisions would receive data on battalions and regiments. It is currently conjectured
that the EEI, augmented by a standardized set of reporting criteria, will form the basis
for the filtering.
The Intelligence Estimate Processor (IEP) is the second component of the
Intelligence sub-module. As previously stated the IEP operates on the perceived data
base of the organization and the intelligence estimate of the next higher unit. The
purpose of the IEP is to prepare an intelligence estimate which will be used by the
planning sub-module of the organization. The specific purpose of the IEP is to identify
enemy units, by type and designation, and to predict their courses of action. This is a
somewhat restricted version of an actual intelligence estimate which would additionally
consider the effect of terrain on the friendly units ability to accomplish its mission. In
ALARM, as currently conceived, the Planning Module will determine the influence of
terrain on the friendly forces. The IEP will be restricted to examining the enemy forces.
Naturally, this will require that the effects of terrain on enemy forces also be
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determined. It is believed that much of the ongoing effort to develop a terrain network
structure, and the corresponding Planning Module which capitalizes on it, will result in
a model which can be used by the IEP with only minor modifications.
Continuing the example of the detected tanks, the battalion IEP would fuse this
new information with the existing intelligence estimate of the battalion. The IEP will
possess the capability to aggregate enemy units and identify the parent organization.
Potential enemy courses of action will be evaluated and passed to the planning
sub-module. The IEP must specifically estimate the arrival time of the enemy units at
selected points on the battlefield. Additionally the IEP will have a methodology which
will allow it to determine the most likely enemy course of action. The intelligence
estimate prepared by the IEP will develop the Situational Inherent Power (SIP) Curves
for the enemy forces [Ref. 3]. These SIP Curves form the basis for the future state
decision making in ALARM.
Concurrent with the development of the battalion's intelligence estimate, the IEP
of the controlling brigade would be revising its intelligence estimate by incorporating
the new combat information which had been passed to its CIP from the battalion. This
updated brigade intelligence estimate would then flow to the subordinate units of the
brigade and be used to alter their own intelligence estimates as required.
C. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The area of identifying and predicting the enemy's course of action forms the
heart of the intelligence estimation procedure. Currently ongoing research into terrain
modeling and avenue of approach determination in ALARM must be completed before
the intelligence estimation methodology can be developed further. However, a
promising area of research may be to develop a set of decision rules to aggregate,
identify and predict enemy activity using "templates". Currently the intelligence officer
develops and uses three general types of templates to assist him in preparing the
intelligence estimate [Ref. l:pp. 6-7,6-81:
1. Doctrinal Templates - models based on enemy tactical doctrine. They portray
frontages, depths, echelon spacing and force composition.
2. Situational Templates - a series of projections that portray how the doctrinal
templates will appear when applied to specific terrain.
3. Event Templates - models of enemy activity. They are sequential projections of
events that relate to both space and time on the battlefield. They indicate the
enemy's ability to adopt a particular course of action.
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The templates are specialized to the enemy and the tactical situation. They are
tools used to assist the intelligence officer, but are at best approximations. Decision
rules based on templates must recognize and adjust for this lack of precision.
D. SUMMARY
The Intelligence Module consists of two components: a Combat Information
Processor (CIP) and a Intelligence Estimate Processor (IEP). Information from the
Execution Module is identified by the collector and flows on the task, force
organizational hierarchy network to the appropriate CIP. The CIP updates the
perceived data base and directs the combat information to other task force elements as
required. The Intelligence Estimate Processor (IEP) prepares an intelligence estimate
which identifies enemy units, their locations and courses of actions. The IEP also
develops the SIP curves for the enemy units which is used by the Planning Module.
Intelligence flows down the task force hierarchy. The Intelligence Module serves as the
funnel for all information between the Execution Module and the Planning Module.
26
III. THE COMBAT INFORMATION PROCESSOR
The previous chapter addressed the proposed Intelligence Module and its two
components, the Combat Information Processor (CIP) and the Intelligence Estimate
Processor (IEP), in general. This chapter further develops the concept of the CIP, its
relationships to the Execution Module and IEP. It specifies the information which
must be passed from the Execution Module and IEP to the CIP and the method by
which this is accomplished. Figure 3.1 shows the linkages between the Execution
Module, the CIP and the IEP; the functions of each are indicated. The logic by which
the CIP processes incoming reports is diagrammed in Figure 3.2 The next sections
discuss the internal CIP logic and propose specific methodology.
A. TARGET VECTORS
Target acquisition is performed in the Execution Module and the results passed
to the appropriate CIP by means of a target vector. When a scanning unit acquires an
entity a target vector is created. This target vector is unique and remains in existance
as long as the scanning unit is able to track the entity. A target vector consists of the
following components:
• I|, I2 - the entity's true identification code and a target number assigned by the
scanning unit. The identification code, Ij, is used by the Execution Module to
address the correct entity for computations. Each entity on the battlefield will
have a unique identification code number. The target number, I2, is a temporary
identification code used by the CIP and IEP. The target number is not unique,
but rather is created when the entity is acquired. If the entity is "lost" to the
scanning unit and subsequently acquired again a new target number is created.
• Xp...,Xk - the true current size (number) of each of the elements of which the
entity is composed.
• Yi,...,Yu - the current perceived (acquired) size (number) of each of the target
elements contained in the entity.
• Di,...,Di. - the number of target elements which have been acquired this
iteration.
• A - an activity code which describes the entity's current perceived combat activity






























Figure 3.1 Functions of the Intelligence Module.
delay, movement to contact, tactical movement while not in contact, etc. Status
codes also apply to geographic entities on the battlefield such as bridges, tunnels,
railheads and airfields. These status codes describe the current perceived state of
the geographic entity.
V - a velocity vector which specifies the speed and direction of the target.
Lj, L2 - the true and perceived location
,
respectively, of the target. Results from
the Execution Module are always reported based on the true location. The






















Figure 3.2 CIP Logic Flow.
T - time of the report.
U - identification code of the unit (sensor) reporting the information. This code
is used to route the report to the correct task-force CIP.
C - a classification code provided by the IEP. This code has several levels. At the
lowest level it indicates the perceived unit size and type of the target. For
example a tank platoon or motorized rifle battalion. At the intermediate level it
identifies targets which are subordinate units to a larger organization. As an
example three targets are identified as tank companies belonging to the same
29
tank battalion. Finally, at the highest level, a target may be identified as being a
specific unit listed in the order of battle, e.g., the 1 st Regiment of the 55
Motorized Rifle Division. This classification is not necessarily the ground truth,
but rather is the result of the decision algorithms used by the IEP.
Since an acquired target does not necessarily remain acquired the current number
of acquired target elements can eventually decrease to zero. When this happens the
target vector for enemy units is deleted. As acquisition is lost the classification code, C,
remains at the highest level reached (unless it is changed by the IEP). Thus the gradual
loss of acquisition represents the degrading of information about a specific target.
Conversely, a target vector for a geographic entity is not deleted when acquisition is
lost; it remains unchanged from the last observation. Essentially, the information about
a geographic entity's status ages after acquisition is lost and may not be accurate.
B. DETERMINING THE PERCEIVED TARGET SIZE
Each CIP will be receiving reports from one or more subordinate units
represented in the Execution Module. The CIP can therefore receive more than one
report about the same target. Each of these reports can differ in the number of target
elements acquired. The CIP must be able to determine the number of target elements
which have been acquired given the number reported by different subordinate units.
Three simple methods for determining the perceived number of acquired target
elements are proposed.
• Method A : Assume there is no overlap in the reported target elements. That is,
each report represents distinct target elements which have not been reported by
any other collector. Under this method the perceived number of target elements
acquired is:
Acquired = min (D-, X'-) (3.1)
where
D- = the total number of the i target elements reported newly acquired this
iteration
X'- = the true number of target elements remaining unacquired.
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Example 3-1
A CIP has three collectors which report the following number of newly acquired

















report about target element 1
The true number of unacquired tanks is 20. In this method the perceived number of
newly acquired tanks is:
min (24,20) = 20 .
• Method B: Assume that there is maximum overlap in the reported target
elements. Each target element is reported at least once. The largest report is the
upper bound on the number of newly acquired target elements, and the remaining
reports are subsets. The perceived number of target elements acquired is:
Acquired = max(d-,...,d-) (3.2)
Example 3-2
Using the data from Example 3-1 the perceived number of acquired tanks is:
max (6 ,8, 10) = 10 .
• Method C: Assume that the number of newly acquired target elements is
bounded by the smallest and largest reports. A weighted averaging technique is then
used to determine the perceived number of target elements acquired. Weighting is
required to place emphasis on those reports which are more credible. A simple
weighting factor could be based on the range separating the collector from the
target, the battlefield environment and the sensor type. Consider the following
weighting function:
where
r = range separating the collector and the target
rmax = the maximum range at which the collector is effective
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W = 1 - (r/rmax)8 for < r < rmax (3.3)
(depends upon battlefield conditions)
g = a shaping constant which is determined for each
- .collector / target combination (can be adjusted
for battlefield conditions).
The shaping constant, g, may be a function of the attenuation coefficient found in
many high resolution models of target detection.
The perceived number of the i target element acquired by the j collector is
given by:
I(Wi x dj) / (£Wj) (3.4)
Example 3-3
As in Example 3-1, each CIP has three collectors reporting to it. Each collector
has the weighting function
W
i
= 1 -(rj/5000) 1 .
The following reports are made:
dj = 6 , r
t
= 4500
dj = 8 , r
2
= 2000
dj = 10 , r
3
= 500




The perceived number of acquired tanks is:
[(.1 x 6) + (.6 x 8) + (.9 x 10)] / [ .1 + .6 + .9 ] = 9 .
Of the three methods presented, weighted averaging provides the most flexibility.
The perceived number of acquired targets can be easily adjusted for range, battlefield
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conditions and sensor (collector) type. It is important, regardless of the method
chosen, that the results are consistent with the target acquisition methodology adopted
for use in the Execution Module.
C. AGGREGATING TARGETS
A CIP receives target information from its collectors through the Execution
Module, filtered combat information from senior and subordinate CIPs, and
intelligence from the associated IEP. The CIP must possess an algorithm which
determines if a new target vector should be created or existing target vectors combined
into a single target vector. A modification of a methodology proposed by Lindstrom
can be used to aggregate target vectors when required [Ref. 4]. A basic assumption is
that the error in the reported target location follows a circular normal distribution. A
target generally consists of several target elements but is reported as a single location.
The error in question measures the collector's ability to accurately judge the true target
center, not its ability to locate specific target elements. The test is composed of two
steps; a similarity check and a proximity test. If the decision is made to combine the
targets, an adjusted location is calculated. The algorithm is:
TABLE 3
MATCHING OF TARGETS
Incoming Existing Existing Existing









Step 1. Check the incoming target vector against current target vectors for
matches in perceived target element types. The matching algorithm proposed by
Lindstrom searches the existing target vectors for a single match in target element type
between the newly reported target and the existing targets. This algorithm can be
modified slightly to consider a heterogeneous forces composed of several different
target element types. The purpose of the algorithm is to match the incoming target
with a similar type target. The size of the targets is not considered when attempting to
find a match, this issue is addressed by the aggregation algorithm.
The proposed methodology ranks potential matches between the existing target
vectors and the incoming reported target. Each target element type of the reported
target is compared to each target element type of an existing target vector. For each
target element type match between the two targets a "I" is scored. For each target
element type which is not matched a "0" is scored. The rank of the potential match is
merely the sum of the scores. Ties in the ranks can be resolved by considering such
factors as: terrain, enemy situation and projected enemy courses of action. As the
terrain model and the intelligence estimation procedures are developed the matching
algorithm can be refined to consider more information about the target and potential
matches (e.g. avenues of approach and activity status). Starting with the highest
ranking potential match the proximity test is conducted until an aggregation takes
place, or all matches have been considered. If no matches are found (i.e., all ranks are
0) a new target vector is created. As an example consider the targets vectors shown in
Table 3. The incoming target, Y, is compared to the three existing target vectors, Xj,
X2 and X->. Three target element matches are found between Y and Xj, two matches
between Y and X2 and no matches between Y and Xy Since Xj has the highest rank
it would be considered first when attempting to aggregate targets. If Y and Xj were
not combined into a single target the aggregation procedure would next consider X2.
Finally, if Y and X2 were not combined a new target vector would be created for Y.
Step 2. Conduct the proximity test - The null hypothesis to be tested is that the















: &XV 1%) * ^X2 , ^Y2)
a. Using a table look up, determine the circular error probable (CEP) associated with
each target report and compute the standard deviation for each. The circular normal
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assumption leads to the following relationship between the CEP and standard
deviation:
ffj = CEPj/1.774 (3.5)
b. Calculate the square of the distance between the reported locations.
D2 = (Xj - X
2 )
2 + (Yr Y2)
2
(3.6)
c. Compute the test statistic
T= D2 /(^+ <$ (3.7)
2.
(note T is distributed x2
= exponential (X = 1/2).
d. If T <x2(°0 then accept H Q and combine target vectors.






2 )/2} + {X2 x(r2 + Sl )/2} (3.8)




rj = (size of target 1) / (size of target 1 + size of target 2)




= ^/(CTj + <7
2 )
The size of a target is measured as the number of primary fighting elements that
it has. The ratio of the sizes, r^ and r->, act as a weighting factors. Without these
weighting factors it would be possible for a small target, which has a relatively small
CEP associated with it, to dominate when calculating the adjusted position. Similarly,
s, and s
2
act as weighting factors which compensate for the CEP of each target.
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Example 3-4
A battalion CIP receives an intelligence update from its associated IEP. The IEP,
based on an intelligence estimation procedure, indicates that there is a motorized rifle
company, consisting of BMPs and tanks, located in the vicinity of cartesian coordinates
(550,765). The CEP for this type and size of unit is assumed to be 200 meters, for the
purpose of the example.
• Step 1. Checking the existing target vectors the battalion CIP identifies a
potential target consisting of 4 BMPs and 2 tanks located at (400,700) with a
CEP of 150 meters. The selected target vector has a rank of two since it matches
both target element.types of the incoming target vector.
• Step 2.
a. Compute the associated standard deviations.
<*
l
= 200/ 1.774 = 112.74
<r
2
= 150/ 1.774 = 84.55
b. Calculate the square of the distance between the reported locations.
D2 = (550-400)2 + (765-700)2 = 26725 .
c. Compute the test statistic.
T = 26725/(12710.31 +17148.70) = 1.35
2
d. Using the relationship between the x 2 an<^ tne
exponential (1/2) distributions, the .95 quantile is given by:
Q.95= -2 1n(l-a) = 5.991 (3.10)
since T = 1.35 < Q.95 = 5.99
do not reject the null hypothesis and combine the targets.
e. The combined target location is calculated by
rj= 10/(10 + 6) = 0.63
r
2
= 6/(10 + 6) = 0.38
s
t
= 112.74/(112.74 + 84.55) = 0.57
s
2
= 84.55/(112.74 + 84.55) = 0.43
so
X' = [550(0.63 + 0.43)/2 + 400(0.38 + 0.57)/2]
= 481.5 ~ 482
V = [765(0.63 + 0.43)/2 + 700(0.38 + 0.57)/2]
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= 737.95 -738
The CIP now has a single target vector classified as a motorized rifle company,
centered at (482 , 738), of which 4 BMPs and 2 tanks have been acquired.
By conjoining the target vectors two errors could have resulted. First, the targets
were wrongly combined and there are actually two separate targets. Second, the targets
were correctly combined but the adjusted location is incorrect. Subsequent reports from
the Execution Module, which uses the true location, may allow both of these types of
errors to be corrected. If there are two different targets, and the distance which
separates them eventually increases, the null hypothesis may be rejected and the targets
disaggregated at some point in the future. The location error is corrected in an iterative
manner as the projected perceived location (based on the velocity components of the
target vector) is compared to the true location reported in subsequent updates from the
Execution Module. Kalman filtering may provide a method for recursively updating the
estimate of the position.
D. COMMUNICATION OF COMBAT INFORMATION BETWEEN CIPS
Each CIP receives direct reports (from the Execution Module) only from those
collectors which are immediately subordinate to it. Thus a battalion CIP obtains (raw)
information only from those sensors assigned to the battalion. Combat information,
however, is passed between CIPs based on task force organization. Not all combat
information is shared; rather it is filtered using a set of decision rules, and then passed
to the appropriate CIP as required. Combat information can either be passed to a
higher CIP or to subordinate CIPs. Lateral communication between CIPs is not done
directly, rather combat information is passed up to the first CIP which is senior to
both and then flows down. For example, in order to pass combat information between
two brigades, which are controlled by different divisions, combat information would
have to travel to the corps CIP and then back down to each brigade. From this
example it can be seen that the filtering which takes place must occur in both
directions (subordinate to senior, senior to subordinate). A set of simple decision rules,
which mimic those used in actual practice, is proposed.
1. Subordinate to Senior Reporting
A general rule applied in practice is that units "look down two levels" when
planning to fight. The planning unit requires combat information on enemy activity at
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least one level down from this. Therefore, combat information about enemy units,
would be reported to the next senior level when it meets the following threshold shown








Initial reports of enemy contact would be reported to the next senior level
when contact is first established; thereafter updates would only occur if a target was at
or above the threshold. For example, a battalion CIP receives a report from a
subordinate unit about a new target sighting of a single tank. This combat information
would flow up the CIP hierarchy and eventually reach the corps CIP. This merely
serves as an alert of enemy activity and allows senior CIPs and IEPs to come on line to
begin the intelligence estimate. Follow-on reports would be filtered in accordance with
the established hierarchy. Thus, the brigade CIP would not receive further information
on the target until it had been classified as a platoon by an IEP, or contact lost.
2. Senior to Subordinate Reporting
A senior CIP may receive raw information from collectors which are operating
directly for it and bypass lower echelons in the task force organization. An example is
division reconnaissance elements which operate forward of the brigades area of
influence. Additionally the senior CIP will receive combat information from the next
higher level CIP. This combat information must be disseminated to the subordinate
units. Under this proposed methodology subordinate units would receive combat
information from the next senior unit whenever a target entered the subordinates area
of interest. Combat information on enemy units would be disaggregated, based on the
established thresholds, and directed to the CIP in whose area of interest the target was
located. Since areas of interest overlap, the target may be reported to more than one
subordinate CIP.
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A special case involves items cf combat information which have been declared
Essential Elements of Information (EEI). EEI are not subject to the normal threshold
restrictions imposed on other combat information. Combat information concerning
EEI is always passed up, or down, the CIP hierarchy to the appropriate CI P.
E. SUMMARY
The CIP is responsible for creating and maintaining the perceived data base for
each organizational level within ALARM. It does this by creating, combining or
deleting target vectors based on reports from the Execution Module, the associated
IEP, and other CIPs. Information received from the Execution Module is always based
on ground truth (i.e., there is no built-in error). Deviations from ground truth arise
because of the decision algorithms used by the IEP and CIP sub-modules.
Further development of the Intelligence Estimate Processor is contingent upon
the completion of ongoing research on the network representation of ALARM entities
and generation of avenues of approach.
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IV. TARGET ACQUISITION
A. MODELING TARGET ACQUISITION
Potential targets occupy a very small fraction of the total available space in the
combat area. This makes it almost impossible to destroy undetected targets. Any
combat model must deal with the method by which targets are acquired by the
opposing forces. The first step is to determine what is meant by target acquisition.
Hartman [Ref. 5:pp. 4-1,4-2] has identified several levels of target acquisition. He
has summarized these levels as follows:
• Localization - the determination from cueing information of the approximate
location; used to focus further search.
• Detection - the decision by an observer that an object in his field of view is of
military interest.
• Classification - the determination by an observer that the object is member of a
broad target category.
• Recognition - the discrimination among finer target classes of a target's class.
• Identification - the establishment by an observer of a target's precise identity.
In the literature the terms "target acquisition" and "target detection" tend to be
used interchangeably. In the remainder of this paper, to avoid confusion, the term
acquisition will refer to the entire target acquisition process whereas detection will refer
to a sub-level of the acquisition process. As Hartman points out:
The response to a target acquisition depends on the level of acquisition attained.
Detection may cause the observer to look more closely or use a different sensor
in an attempt to gain more information. Identification may be required before
combatants are allowed to engage the target. [Ref. 5:p. 4.2]
The physical attributes of a target that are the basis for its detection are often
referred to as target signatures [Ref. 6:pp. 11-8,11-9]. Common signatures are:
• Trajectory - created by the path of a projectile in flight. It is detectable by radar
sensors and associated with artillery and mortar weapons.
• Silhouette - the visible configuration of a target. The probability of detection is
degraded by poor visibility and masking by terrain, vegetation and camouflage.
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• Heat - infrared energy emitted by a target. This signature is associated with
weapon firings, vehicle engines and even body heat. Heat is detected by IR
sensors and affected by atmospheric conditions.
• Flash - equivalent to heat, but transmitted over the visible portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
• Smoke/Dust - caused by weapon firings and vehicle/troop movement. This
signature is observable during daylight.
• Sound - emitted by almost all targets and detectable by sound ranging sensors.
• Motion - associated with any moving object. It is detectable both visually and by
radar sensors. This signature is degraded by poor visibility (in the case of visual
observation), terrain and vegetation masking and distance. Accuracy of location
is further degraded by the motion itself.
In addition to the factors listed above which degrade a specific target signature,
there is the common factor of range.
Any target detection model must consider, either explicitly or implicitly, both the
signatures and the factors which degrade them. Additionally, it is useful to develop a
model that is based on target categories. The Engineering Design Handbook
(DARCOM-P 708-101) [Ref. 6:pp. 11-2,11-4] defines the following target categories:
• Point Target: A target which usually consists of a single target element. It is
assumed to have dimensions that are small in comparison to the range between
the weapon (sensor) and the target.
• Area Target: A two dimensional target which can consist of one or more target
elements (e.g., a long bridge or an infantry company, in which the target elements
are the individual infantrymen).
• Simple Target: A target whose elements are functionally independent. To kill a
simple target each element must be destroyed (e.g. a tank platoon).
• Complex Target: A target whose elements are not functionally independent. The
destruction of one of the components will kill the entire target even if the other
components are undamaged. An example of a complex target is an air defense
missile site. If the fire control center is destroyed the missile cannot be launched,
even if it is undamaged.
• Homogeneous Target: A target composed of target elements which are of the
same type. A convoy of trucks could be a homogeneous target as opposed to a
combined arms force consisting of tanks and infantry.
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• Heterogeneous Target: A target in which the individual target elements are not
all of the same type (e.g., a combined arms force of tanks and infantry).
• Stationary Target: A target that is fixed or not subject to movement while under
attack.
• Moving Target: A target which possesses a non-zero velocity vector.
B. ACQUISITION MODELS
To describe the stochastic nature of target detection, Koopman [Ref. 7]
introduced two detection models: the glimpse model and the continuous search model.
These models, in one form or another, serve as the basis for modeling the target
acquisition process, for a single observer vs. a single target, in most combat
simulations.
1. The Glimpse Model
In the glimpse model the observer (sensor) is assumed to have a series of
distinct opportunities to detect a target. These opportunities are known as glimpses.
On each glimpse the probability of detection, given that it has not occured earlier, is p-,
where the subscript i indexes the i glimpse. The probability of detection on the n
glimpse is given by:
P[N=n] = Pn *#n qi (4.1)
where q- is 1-p-.
The probability of detection on or before the n glimpse is:
P[N < n] = 1 - II q: (4.2)
I -I
The probability that a target is not detected in n glimpses is:
P[N > n] = n q: (4.3)
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A very important special case arises when the probability of detection on a
glimpse remains the same for each glimpse (p = 1-q). In this case, a glimpse can be
considered to be an independent Bernoulli trial and the probability of detection on the
n glimpse becomes:
P[N = n] = px qn-l (44)
This is the geometric probability distribution with parameter p and n = 1,2,3,... . It
follows that:
P[N <n] = 1-q 11 (4.5)
and
P[N > n] = qn (4.6)
Based on the geometric distribution the expected number of glimpses until detection is:
E(n) = 1/p (4.7)
And the variance is:
V(n) = q/p2 (4.8)
Hartman [Ref. 5:pp. 4-5,4-7] notes that the numerical value of p, for the
geometric distribution can be estimated experimentally. He suggests that a number of
detection trials be conducted and the sample mean (XBAR) computed. Since the
sample mean is the maximum likelihood estimater of E(n):
E(n) = 1/p ~ XBAR (4.9)
or
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p = 1/XBAR (4.10)
In order to obtain p for different conditions a series of experiments for each
observational condition could be conducted and the results tabled.
2. The Continuous Search Model
The continuous search model is based on a detection rate function, D(t), and
the assumption that the probability of detection in a short time interval, conditioned
on the failure to detect earlier, is proportional to the length of the interval. In this
model the observer (sensor) maintains continuous observation. The continuous search
model is developed as follows:
Let
p(t) = probability of detection at or before time t.
q(t) = probability of no detection at or before time t. and
D(t) = detection rate function, which may depend on time.
Then
q(t) = 1 - P(t)
Further, q(t + At), the failure to detect during time, t + At, is the product of the
failure to detect at or before t and the failure to detect during the additional time, At,
conditioned on the failure to detect earlier.
Thus
q(t+At)= q(t)[l - D(t)At] (4.11)
= q(t) - q(t)D(t)At
rearranging terms
[q(t + At)-q(t)]/At= -q(t)D(t) (4.12)
now taking the limit as At -^0
dq(t)/dt = -q(t)D(t) (4.13)
This is a first order differential equation with a solution form of:
t
q(t) = C x exp[-jD(s)ds] (4.14)
o
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where the time scale is chosen so that the search begins at time = 0. By further
assuming that q(0) = 1, the exact solution is:
t




p(t) = 1 - exp[-jD(s)ds] (4.16)
o
which is the probability of detecting a target in a search beginning at time, 0, and
ending at time, t.
A special case arises when the detection rate function D(t) is considered to be
a constant, D. The probability of detecting a target becomes:
p(t) = 1 -exp[-Dt] (4.17)
This is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the exponential
distribution with parameter, D. It follows therefore that, in this case, the time of
detection for a search during the interval, [0,t], is an exponentially distributed random
variable with:
E[T] = 1/D (4.18)
and
V[T] = 1/D2 (4.19)
Hartman [Ref. 5:p. 4-13] points out that the exponential distribution is a high
variance distribution. Short detection times are most likely, but long detection times
can occur. Further the exponential distribution is the continuous analogue of the
discrete geometric distribution. Both the geometric and exponential models involve the
assumption of independence of successive time increments and have the memoryless
property. This property can be expressed as follows:
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The fact that you have been searching for five minutes without success does
not influence the probability of achieving detection in the next ten seconds. It is
the same as if you had just begun to search now. [Ref. 5:p. 4-13]
3. The Glimpse and Continuous Search Models in a Simulation
Generally a combat simulation will fall into one of two broad categories based
the manner in which the simulation time clock is handled. In the first method the
simulation is advanced in a fixed time step. At each time step the simulation calls all of
the subroutines, as required, and computes the results. The second method is event
scheduling. In the event scheduling approach the time step is not fixed, rather the time
of the next "event" is calculated and the simulation clock is advanced to that point.
The glimpse and continuous search models have been adapted to both methodologies.
Both of these target acquisition models have been extensively used in high
resolution combat simulations. One of the difficulties which may arise in using either
model is the need to consider each sensor/target combination. In a large scale model
like ALARM this may prove to be prohibitive in terms of computer time. Additionally
individual items are often not represented, but aggregated into macro-targets. Of course
it is possible to reduce the number of sensor/target combinations which must be
evaluated by including a number of simple tests to screen out ineligible targets. For
example, tests which might be included are friend vs enemy, range, sector, line of sight,
and target class. These tests make it computationally more reasonable for a large scale
combat simulation to handle point targets (both simple and complex classifications).
Finally there is the problem of cueing. If a single target element of a group of target
elements is detected this tends to focus further search on the surrounding area. Because
of this the probability of detecting the remaining targets elements may be increased.
Many large scale combat simulations make indirect use of the glimpse and
continuous-search models by using output from high resolution combat simulations to
estimate the process coefficients in the large scale simulation. Hartman [Ref. 8:p. 1-22]
states that this estimation procedure ". . . is a particularly important part of any
aggregated modelling project." He further points out that many agencies maintain
libraries of aggregated process coefficients to various combat scenarios so that
appropriate values can be selected without having to repeat the high resolution
simulation each time.
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The next section reviews Lanchester-type models of attrition and discusses
their possible application to modeling acquisition in large scale combat simulations.
Chapter V then presents a methodology by which the acquisition coefficients of a
Lanchesterian model can be estimated from the output of a high resolution combat
simulation which uses either the glimpse or continuous-search model.
C. LANCHESTER'S EQUATIONS AND ALARM
Lanchester-type models are often used in large scale combat simulations to model
attrition. In fact, ALARM will likely use Lanchester differential equations. If one is
willing to accept Lanchesterian attrition, it is also appealing to believe that other
frequently occurring events such as acquisition, repaired vehicles returning to the
battlefield, and ammunition consumption also can be modelled by Lanchester-type
equations. The key feature of all these events is that they occur often enough during
the course of a battle that estimates for the time between occurances can be reasonably
determined. Infrequent events, however, would not be amenable to this methodology
(e.g. tactical nuclear strikes).
The preceding sections of this chapter presented two methods for modeling the
target acquisition process. Point targets are handled easily by either the glimpse or
continuous search models. However, the sheer number of individual sensors and
targets in ALARM precludes the use of these models in many cases. This section
investigates the use of Lanchester-type differential equations to model target
acquisition. The use of Lanchester based models allow both force size and mix to be
considered using a single methodology. Thus all classifications of targets (point/area,
homogeneous/heterogeneous, and simple/complex) and sensor force sizes and mixes are
covered. In the remainder of this chapter the basic homogeneous formulations for
Lanchester's Laws of Combat are reviewed. Modifications of these basic laws, to
include a heterogeneous formulation, are then investigated for their applicability to
modeling target acquisition under a variety of conditions.
D. LANCHESTERS LAWS OF COMBAT
1. First Linear Law (Direct Aimed Fire)
In this case the attrition rate is constant. There is no concentration of forces
allowed, thus the battle consists of a series of individual engagements. Lanchester's
First Linear Law is:
dX/dt = -a with X(0) = X Q (4.20)
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and
dY/dt = -b with Y(0) = YQ (4.21)
where - '
X = X(t) = the size of the X force at any time t.
Y = Y(t) = the size of the Y force at any time t.
a = the constant rate at which the X forces are lost per
unit time (attrition coefficient),
b = the constant rate at which the Y forces are lost
per unit time (attrition coefficient).
XQ = initial X force size.
YQ = initial Y force size.
and
t,a,b > 0.
In this case the solution of the differential equations are:
X = X - at for X > (4.22)
Y = YQ - bt for Y > (4.23)
The length of time required to annihilate the X force is:
t
ann
= X /a (4.24)
and for the Y force the time to annihilation is:
<ann = Vb C- 25 >
(note: Only one of these may occur, either the X force is annihilated or the Y force is
annihilated, but not both.)
This Linear Law can easily be applied to acquisition by letting:
X = X(t) = the number of unacquired elements
of the X force at any time t.
a = the detection rate = l/(mean time to detect).
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XQ = the initial unacquired X force size.
Now, the number of X forces which remain unacquired at any given time t is:
X = X - at




This formulation may be useful for modeling target acquisition when a
sensor's scanning field is severely restricted due to terrain, vegetation and/or battlefield
obscurants. Under these circumstances the scanning force will not be able to
concentrate sensors by assigning overlapping sweep sectors. Also, if a sensor's sweep
sector is narrow enough, only a single potential target may be able to occupy the
sector at a given time. In dense vegetation (e.g., jungle) the defenders seldom have
overlapping fields of view. These fields of view also tend to be only a few meters deep
or wide. Correspondingly, the attacking force's ability to maneuver is also limited, and
the attackers will tend to move in column formations. Therefore, as the attacking force
moves through the defended area, acquisition as well as attrition may occur at a
constant rate.
2. Second Linear Law (Area Firing)
Here the assumptions are that the firing is unaimed and is concentrated in an
area occupied by a combatant. Additionally, the size of the area is independent of the
combatant's size. Thus the attrition for the X force is proportional to the number of Y
forces firing into the area and the density of the X forces in the area. The differential
equations are:
dX/dt = -aXY with X(0) = X Q (4.26)
and
dY/dt = -bYX with Y(0) = YQ (4.27)
A solution of the equations is:
X = {-X (k-l)exp[-bX (k-l)t]}/{cxp[-bX (k-l)t]-k} (4.28)
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and
Y = {-Y (k-l)}/{exp[-bX (k-l)t]-k} (4.29)
where - /
k = aY /bX (4.30)
The X to Y ratio at any time t is:
X/Y = (X /Y )exp[-bX (k-l)t] (4.31)
so that in a fight to the finish the X force wins when
k < 1.0
and Y wins when
k > 1.0 .
An alternate form of the solution is:
X = {-X (k'-l)}/{exp[-aY (k'-l)t]-k'} (4.32)
and
Y = {-Y (k'-l)exp[-aY (k'-l)t]}/{exp[-aY (k'-l)t]-k'} (4.33)
where
k' = bX /aYQ (4.34)
In a fight to the finish the X force wins when
k' > 1.0
and Y wins when
k' < 1.0.
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In both cases if k = k' = 1 then, although the number of X and Y forces vary during
the battle, their ratios remain constant and the battle is a draw.
Lanchester's Second Linear Law seems to be a reasonable model for medium
to long range target acquisition. The scanning force in this case is unable to
concentrate its sensors on a specific target because of the need to cover a relatively
large area. This formulation has an interesting application to target acquisition where
targets have the ability to suppress searching sensors (it is assumed here that once a
sensor is suppressed it remains so). If, as before,
X = the number of unacquired elements of the X force at time, t
a = the detection rate
XQ = the initial unacquired X force size
and
Y = the number of unsuppressed sensors of the Y force at time, t
b = the rate at which sensors can be suppressed
YQ = the initial unsuppressed Y force sensors
the solutions now give the number of unacquired targets and unsuppressed sensors,
respectively, at any time, t.
3. Square Law
In this case the attrition rate is directly proportional to the numerical strength
of the opposing force involved in the battle at that time. This allows forces to be
concentrated. As opposed to the First Linear Law assumption, where the battle was a
series of individual fights, now a group of combatants can concentrate their capabilities
on a single opponent. Under the right circumstances this will allow a numerically
inferior force to defeat a larger one. The differential equations are:
dX/dt = -aY with X(0) = XQ (4.35)
and
dY/dt = -bX with Y(0) = YQ (4.36)
The force levels at any time t are given by:




-VWa" X )exp(v^b t) + (Y + Vb/i X )exp(-Vib t)} (4.39)
In a fight to the finish if:
X /YQ > Va/b then the X force wins.
If:
X /YQ < Va/b then the Y force wins.
And if:
X /YQ = Va/ D then the battle will be a draw.
Just as a force is able to concentrate its combat power, it is also able to focus
its sensors. The Square Law, depending on the sensor type, would seem to especially
apply to target acquisition at short to medium ranges or when a scanning unit has
prior intelligence about enemy locations . The reduced area which must be covered by
the sensors will allow the scanning force to assign overlapping sweep sectors. These
sweep sectors can be centered on avenues of approach into and adjacent to the
position or on likely (suspected) enemy positions. Thus, acquisition will depend directly
on the number of sensors available at any given time.
These three basic Lanchester Laws can only begin to model the complex task
of target acquisition. Many factors, in addition to the number of sensors and targets,
influence the process. Some of the more obvious are range (separation distance), the
environment, employment doctrine, and tactical scenario. Many extensions to
Lanchester's basic equations have been proposed in order to make them more
comprehensive. Several of these are examined next.
E. MODEL EXTENSIONS
1. Extensions for Replacement Rate
Lanchester differential equations can be extended to account for replacement
of attrited target elements. For example the Second Linear Law, with replacement, may
become:
dX/dt = -aXY + K (4.41)
and
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dY/dt = -bYX + L (4.43)
where
K = the replacement rate for the X forces
L = the. replacement rate for the Y forces .
One of the fundamental differences between applying Lanchesters equations to
the attrition process and target acquisition is regeneration. Once a target element is
attrited it does not
,
under normal circumstances, rejoin the battle. This is not the case
with the acquisition of targets. After a target is acquired, continuous surveillance may
not be possible. If contact is lost for a long enough period, the target element
essentially reverts back to unacquired status. The use of a replacement rate function,
interpreted as target elements returning to an unacquired status, could be used to
model this phenomenon. The rate at which target elements return to the unacquired
condition would generally be a function of range, terrain, environment and the tactical
situation. In the case of suppressed sensors the replacement rate function could model
their return to operational status. Both uses would require care in the implementation
to insure that the forces did not inadvertently grow beyond their true size due to
replacements.
2. Range Dependent Acquisition Coefficients
Just as attrition depends on the range separating the combatants, so does
acquisition. For small changes in range the attrition (acquisition) coefficients may be
relatively invariant. However, when range changes appreciably during the course of the
battle the attrition (acquisition) coefficients should reflect this movement. Taylor
[Ref. 9:pp. 54,55] reviewing research in the area due to Bonder, discusses the following




,for <r <= r
e
(4.45)
,for r > rp
where
a(r) = a range dependent attrition coefficient
a = the maximum kill rate
r = the maximum effective range of the weapon system
r = the current separation range between the target and weapon
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u = a shaping parameter used to adjust for the weapons systems
kill rate.
This functional form should be appropriate for modeling the range dependence
of the target acquisition process. Additionally, by judicious choice of the shaping
parameter, u, other variables such as terrain, environment and tactical situation may be
included. One possibility is to make the shaping parameter, u, a function of the
attenuation coefficient found in some target acquisition models. The U.S. Army's Night
Vision and Electro-Optical Laboratories (NVEOL) has developed a target acquisition
model for use in high resolution combat simulations. The NVEOL model allows for the
attenuation of target signature due to range and atmospheric conditions which exist
between the sensor and target.
3. Fraction of Force Which is Effective
Up to now it has been assumed that all the sensors of the scanning force are
effective and can be concentrated on one sector. This generally is not the case. The
scanning unit normally will maintain 360° surveillance of its area of responsibility.
Depending upon the tactical situation, however, its attention may not be equally
focused in all directions. The majority of its sensors may be pointed toward sectors
along and adjacent to a principal direction of orientation. This will result in some
sectors having few, if any
,
sensors covering them. Therefore, the rate at which targets
are acquired may depend upon the angle between the scanning unit's principal
direction of orientation and the target. Lanchester differential equations can be
modified by including a factor for the fraction of the scanning force which is effective.








= the fraction of the Y force scanning the sector(s) in which the X force is
located.
Two simple models for determining the fraction of scanning forces which are
effective are discussed below.
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a. Circular Scanning
The assumption is that the scanning force does not have a principal
direction of orientation, but rather scans all sectors in a 360° arc (at random) with
equal intensity. This would result in a circular probability density function. The
expected fraction of sensors (or time spent) searching a sector within which a target is
located is simply:
1/(2tu)J" dt , < 9 < 2k (4.49)
©
where:
8 j = lower boundary of the search sector
2
= upper boundary of the search sector .
A unit may use this type of scanning when it is isolated and is unable to
establish physical contact with adjacent units or does not possess sufficient knowledge
which would allow it to determine a principal direction of enemy attack. Examples are
a small tactical unit conducting a reconnaissance patrol, a combat unit which has been
cut off from other friendly units by an attacking enemy force, or a support unit in the
rear area which is subject to harassing attacks from many directions.
b. Cardoid Scanning
An alternative model which may apply when the scanning unit concentrates
its sensors into sectors along a principal direction of orientation is the cardoid
probability density function displayed in Figure 4.1 The expected fraction of sensors (or
time spent) searching a sector within which a target is located is:
1/(271)]" (l + cos6)d0 ,0 <0<27i (4.51)
(9,
where
0j ,G 2 are the angular limits of the search sector as measured from the principal
direction of orientation.
The cardoid probability density function concentrates scanning around the
the principal direction of orientation, 6 = 0. This would be a suitable model for the
majority of tactical situations faced by a typical combat unit. In the attack a unit
maintains 360° security (surveillance) but concentrates its search in the direction of the
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attack. Similarly, in the defense, a unit is positioned to cover designated avenues of
approach. The unit orients its search to cover this avenue of approach. It would also,




Figure 4. 1 Cardoid Function.
One of the touted advantages of using Lanchester-type differential models
is the ability to consider heterogeneous forces. These heterogeneous formulations are
presented next.
F. HETEROGENEOUS FORCES
Modern combat forces rarely fight as a pure (homogeneous) force. Rather,
different systems (infantry, armor, artillery and aircraft) are integrated into a combined
arms force which capitalizes on the unique strengths of each system. Lanchester's
original differential models have been modified to consider combat between these
combined arms (heterogeneous) forces. As an example consider a battle between two
heterogeneous forces where the X force has "\" different type systems and the Y force
has "J" different type systems. If attrition occurs according to the Square Law, the
rates at which specific systems are attrited are given by:
J
dXj/dt =






-2 b-kjjXj ,j = 1,2,...,J (4.55)
with - '
XjCO) = Xi0 and Yj(0) = Yjo
Where
Xj = remaining number of i-type X elements at time, t
Y:= remaining number of j-type Y elements at time, t
a:-= rate at which the j
tn type Y force system attrits
one of the im type system of force X
b- = rate at which the ith type X force system attrits
one of the j
n type system of force Y
g- = proportion (probability) that the j
th type Y system
th
engages the i type X system, ^ g:- ^ 1.0 .
k-: = proportion (probability) that the i n type X system
engages the j
tjl type Y system, ^ k- ^ 1.0 .
Xj = initial number of i-type X systems
Y- = initial number of j-type Y systems.
x r
(notet^gj! * l.OandJkij < 1.0)
i ' \ j - *
Similar heterogeneous formulations apply to the Linear Laws. As suggested
previously with homogeneous attrition models, the heterogeneous formulations could
be used to model target acquisition between opposing combined arms forces.
One of the difficulties that may arise in using heterogeneous formulations (both
in attrition and acquisition models) is the problem of determining the allocation
proportion coefficients for each opposing system combination. Some coefficients may
be obvious, such as the proportion of anti-aircraft radar systems devoted to detecting
approaching infantry. An example of a more subtle case, though, involves ground
surveillance radars (GSR). These sensors are capable of detecting both motion and
sound. Typically they are employed to cover large sectors and alert the unit to
approaching enemy forces. They do not search exclusively for any specific type of
57
enemy force, but rather search for both dismounted infantry and armored forces. To
assign a proportion of the available GSR to detecting only a single type target would
incorrectly degrade its performance against a combined arms force. A solution may be
to estimate the acquisition coefficients from the output of a high resolution model.
These estimated acquisition coefficients will reflect the rates at which each specific
sensor-type acquires each target-type. The allocation proportion coefficients should be
intrinsic to the estimated acquisition coefficients.
This thesis begs the question of how allocation proportion coefficients are finally
determined. It is presumed that if the decision is made to use a heterogeneous
Lanchester-type formulation to model target acquisition, follow-on studies will be
conducted to resolve problems surrounding the assignment of the allocation
coefficients. The next chapter presents a methodology by which acquisition coefficients
can be estimated from the output of a high resolution combat simulation or field trial
results.
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V. DETERMINATION OF ACQUISITION COEFFICIENTS
A. THE ACQUISITION-RATE COEFFICIENT'S RELATIONSHIP TO
ACQUISITION TIME




In this case the attrition rate function, a(t,X,Y), may depend on time, the X force level
and the Y force level. For example, using the square law formulation:
dX/dt = -aY
dY/dt = -bX




where a and b are the attrition rate coefficients.
Most current calculations of attrition rate coefficients are based on the premise that
the coefficients are the reciprocal of the expected time for an individual firer to kill a
single target. Therefore, when using a Lanchester-type model for acquisition it would
seem reasonable to use the reciprocal of the expected time for a searcher to acquire a




where E[*] is the mathematical expectation and T
xy is the time (a random variable)
for a Y searcher to acquire an X target.
Using this definition, the determination of the expected time to acquire a target is
the fundamental calculation required for arriving at the acquisition-rate coefficients in
a Lanchester-type model.
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B. JUSTIFICATION FOR USING THE RECIPROCAL OF THE TIME TO
ACQUIRE
This justification follows an argument presented by Taylor [Ref. 10:pp. 397-437]
concerning the use of the reciprocal of the expected time to kill a target as the
attrition-rate coefficient in a homogeneous Lanchester-type combat model.
1. Acquisition as a Continuous Time Markov-Chain
Let acquisition be modelled as a continuous time Markov-Chain. The number
of unacquired combatants on each side is a non-negative, integer random variable
where:
rrig = the initial number of X force combatants
rig = the initial number of Y force combatants
M(t) = a random variable, the number of unacquired X force combatants at time
t with realization denoted as m
N(t) = a random variable, the number of unacquired Y force combatants at time t
with realization denoted as n
G(t,m,n) = the rate at which the X force is acquired
H(t,m,n) = the rate at which the Y force is acquired
2. Development of The Forward Kolmogorov Equations
Let the individual component state probability vector be denoted as, P(t,m,n),
which is the probability that at time, t, the number of unacquired X force combatants
is m and the number of unacquired Y force combatants is n given that at time, t = 0,
the number of unacquired X force combatants was m^ and the number of unacquired
Y force combatants was nQ . Further assume that the probability that one X force
combatant is acquired in the interval [t,t + h] is:
G(t,m,n) x h
and that the probability that one Y force combatant is acquired in the interval [t,t + h]
is:
H(t,m,n) x h
and finally, the probability of a total of more than one acquisition on either one or
both sides during the interval [t,t+h] is:
o(h)
( a function f(*) is o(h) if lim f(h)/h = ).
The initial conditions for the forward Kolmogorov equations are:
P(0,m,n) = 1 ,for m = mg and n = nQ
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P(0,m,n) = ,for m * ir^ or n * nQ
and
P(t,m,n) = ,for m > rrig or n > nQ .
Now for < m ^ rrig and < n <> nQ
P(t + h,m,h) = P(t,m,n) * (l-[G(t,m,n) x h + H(t,m,n) x h]}
+ P(t,m+ l,n) x G(t,m+ l,n) x h
+ P(t,m,n+ 1) x H(t,m,n+ 1) x h + o(h)
or since there is some probability that the state vector will be in the status, M(t + h) =
m and N(t + h) = n, then one of four mutually exclusive events must have occurred:
(1) M(t) = m and N(t) = n and there were no acquisitions during the interval
fct+h]
(2) M(t) = m+ 1 and N(t) = n and one X force combatant was acquired in the
interval [t,t + h].
(3) M(t) = m and N(t) = n+ 1 and one Y force combatant was acquired in the
interval [t,t + h].
(4) two or more acquisitions took place during [t,t + h].
Multiplying through and rearranging the term results in:
[P(t + h,m,n)-P(t,m,n)]/h = P(t,m+ l,n) x G(t,m + l,n)
+ P(t,m,n+ 1) x H(t,m,n+ 1)
- P(t,m,n) x G(t,m,n)
- P(t,m,n) x H(t,m,n).
Taking the limit as h ->0 results in the following:
dP(t,m,n)/dt = P(t,m+ l,n)xG(t,m + l,n) + P(t,m,n + l)xH(t,m,n+ 1) (5.4)
-P(t,m,n)x[G(t,m,n) + H(t,m,n)]
Equation 5.4 is the forward Kolmogorov equation for the probability
distribution of the number of unacquired combatants on both sides during the course
of the battle. This equation applies only for the initial conditions given above. The
Kolmogorov equations have a slightly different form at the boundaries. The full set of
Kolmogorov equations is given by Taylor [Ref. 10:p. 408].
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3. Distribution of Times Between Acquisitions
To determine the distribution of times between acquisitions the probability of
no acquisitions in a time interval, [0,t], is considered. For m = m^ and n = nQ then:
dP(t,morn )/dt = -[G(t,m ,n )+ H(t fm ,n )] x P(t,m ,n ) (5.6)
with the initial condition P(0,m ,n ) = 1 .
This is an ordinary differential equation of the form:
dP/dt + Q(t) x P(t) = where
Q(t) = G(t,rr^,ri ) + H(t fm ,n )
and with a solution given by:
t
P(t,m ,n ) = exp{-
<
f[G(s,m ,n ) + H(s,m ,n )] ds} (5.8)
o
Now if Tl is the time at which the first acquisition occurs when measured from the
beginning of the battle then:
Prob[Tl > t] = P(t,m ,n ) (5.10)
which is the probability of no acquisitions in the interval, [0,t]. The distribution
function
,
Fji(t), for the time to the first acquisition is given by:
FT1 (t)
= 1 - Prob[ Tl > t ] or
t
FT1 (t)
= 1 - exp{-J" [G(s,m n )+H(s,m ,n )] ds} (5.12)
If the acquisition rate functions are independent of time then the acquisition
process is a continuous-time Markov chain with stationary transition probabilities. The
rate functions may be written as:
G(t,m ,n ) = A(m ,n )
Hfomg.ng) = B(m ,nQ )
and then
FT1 (t)
= 1 - exp{- [A(m ,n )+B(m ,n )]xt} (5.14)
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Equation 5.14 can be recognized as the distribution function of an exponential
probability density function with parameter:
X = [ACmQ.ng + BCmQ.nQ)] .
Taylor [Ref. 10:p. 428] shows that this result can be generalized to any time interval,




(s) = [A(m,n) + B(m,n)] x exp{-[A(m,n) + B(m,n)]s} (5.16)
where S = time between two successive acquisitions. The expected time between
acquisitions is:
E[TS ] = l/[A(m,n) + B(m,n)] (5.18)
Now, given that an acquisition has occurred the probability that an X force combatant
was acquired is:
A(m,n)/[A(m,n)+ B(m,n)]
and the probability that a Y force combatant was acquired is:
B(m,n)/[A(m,n) + B(m,n)]
Finally, given that at time, t, the Markov chain is in state, M(t) = m and N(t) = n,
then the probability that an acquisition occurs on or before time, t + s, and that an X
force combatant is acquired is:
A(m,n)/[A(m,n)+ B(m,n)] J[A(m,n)+ B(m,n)]exp{-[A(m,n)+ B(m,n)]t}dT
o
Similarly for a Y force acquisition:
s
B(m,n)/[A(m,n) + B(m,n)] J[A(m,n) + B(m,n)]exp{-[A(m,n) + B(m,n)]r} dt
o
The above results form the computational basis for determining the
acquisition rates in a Lanchester-type model of acquisition. The next section discusses
a procedure to estimate the acquisition rate coefficients from the output of high
resolution simulations or field trials.
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C. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION OF ACQUISITION-RATE
COEFFICIENTS
The actual determination of numerical values for attrition coefficients has been
accomplished by two approaches [Ref. 12:pp. 1,4]:
(1) A statistical estimate based on data generated by a detailed Monte-Carlo
combat simulation.
(2) An analytical submodel of the attrition process.
This section presents a maximum likelihood estimation procedure for the
acquisition coefficients of a Lanchester-type model of acquisition. It is based on the
work done by Clark [Ref. 11] while developing his "Combat Analysis Model",
COMAN, and presented by Taylor [Ref. 12:pp. 125,140]. The use of this procedure
presupposes that data concerning the time between acquisitions is available from either
a high resolution, Monte-Carlo simulation or field trials. This data is then used to
compute statistical estimates of the acquisition-rate coefficients.
To illustrate the procedure the continuous-time Markov-chain analog of the
deterministic, homogeneous, Lanchester square law will be used. Specifically let
acquisition be modelled by:
dX/dt = -A(m,n) = -aY with X(0) = XQ
dY/dt = -B(m,n) = -bX with Y(0) = YQ .
where
a = number of X targets acquired/(Y observer * time)
b = number of Y targets acquired/(X observer x time)
Assume that a high resolution, Monte-Carlo simulation has been run until K
acquisitions have occurred and that the time between successive acquisitions of X force
and Y force combatants has been recorded. The time of the k acquisition ( for k =
1,2,... ,K ) will be a random variable, T^, with realization t^. Starting the battle at t =
the total length of the battle will be T^. Then using the corresponding continuous-time
Markov-chain model and the notation previously defined, let :
m^ = the number of unacquired X force combatants just after the occurrence of
the k acquisition
n^ = the number of unacquired Y force combatants just after the occurrence of
the k acquisition
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S = time between consecutive acquisitions (a random variable) with realization
denoted as s
Cxk = 1 if the k
th
acquisition is an X force combatant and otherwise
C^ = ' 1 if the kiil acquisition is a Y force combatant and otherwise
cy
t - I c\
Note that







From the continuous-time Markov-chain model developed in the preceding
sections Taylor [Ref. 12:pp. 130,131] shows that the time between acquisitions is an
exponentially distributed random variable with density function given by:
f
s
(s) = (an + bm) x exp[-(an + bm)s] (5.20)
The maximum likelihood function for the sequence of acquisitions is the product
of each of the individual components. For the k acquisition the individual
contribution for the acquisition of an X force combatant is:
(ank.j) expKan^j + bmj^Xtj.- tk.j)]
The contribution for the acquisition of a Y force combatant is:
(bmk.!) exp[-(ank.j + hm^.jXV tk . t )J
Combining the two components and using the indicator variables results in:
(ank-l)
C
*(bmk-l) kexP^ank-l + bmk-lXV lk-l)l
Therefore the likelihood function is given by:
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L(a,b) = n(ank . 1 )^|t (bmk . 1 )^kexp[-(ank . 1 + bmk . 1 )(tk-tk. 1 )] (5.22)
k*l
Taking the natural logarithm of the likelihood function and maximizing it with respect








/[£mk. 1(tk -tk. 1)] (5.26)
These coefficients are the ratio of the total number of acquisitions of the combatants
on one side to the total number of acquisition time units directed against that force by
the opposing side. Thus the dimensions of the coefficients are acquisitions per time.
Taylor [Ref. 12:pp. 136,138] shows that this result is a special case and may be
generalized. When the rate functions are of the form:
A(m,n) = a x ga(m,n) (5.28)
B(m,n) = b x gb(m,n) (5.30)
where
a and b are acquisition coefficients
and
ga(m,n) and g^(m,n) are functions which depend only on the state that the
Markov process is in (i.e. they are independent of time)
the estimators are then given by:
K
a= CVtlga^k-l^k-lXtk-Vl)] < 5 - 32 )
l<
b = C?
t / [ £ g^m^nj^X^ - tk-1 )] (5.34)
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The maximum likelihood estimation method was illustrated for homogeneous
forces. Its applicability also extends to heterogeneous forces without extensive
modification. The estimated parameters are those for acquisition of the i type X
combatant by the }
th type Y combatant and vice versa. This requires detailed data on
the successive acquisition times for all types of combatants on one side by all types of
combatants on the opposing side. The result will be a set of estimated parameters a.-
and b: : for all (i,j) and (j,i) pairs .
J* 1
These coefficients will depend upon the rate by which specific target types are
acquired by each sensor type in the high resolution model. Thus the allocation
proportion coefficients of a heterogeneous Lanchester-type formulation are contained
in the acquisition coefficients which have been estimated from a high resolution
combat simulation.
D. THE RATE AT WHICH ACQUIRED AN ACQUIRED TARGET RETURNS
TO THE UNACQUIRED STATE
One of the fundamental differences between the attrition and acquisition
processes is the regeneration of targets. In attrition models a destroyed target is
permanently eliminated from the battlefield (this excludes those targets which are
subsequently repaired and return to the battle). The acquisition process differs
significantly in this respect; a target may make multiple shifts between the acquired and
unacquired states during the course of the battle. An acquisition model based on a
Lanchester-type formulation could account for this phenomenon by including a
"replacement" coefficient. The basic Lanchester formulation for acquisition which
includes targets returning to the unacquired state would have the form:




where K(t,X,Y) and X(t,X,Y) are the acquisition-loss functions and measure the
respective rates at which the X and Y forces return to the unacquired state.
In order to determine the rate at which combatants revert to the unacquired state
the factors which cause the loss of acquisition must be determined. These factors can
be grouped into three general categories.
• Physical - acquisition is lost due factors such as violation of range thresholds (the
target moves beyond maximum range or closes to under minimum range), loss of
line of sight, the cessation of the signature required for continued acquisition, etc.
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• Attrition - either the target is destroyed or the sensor(s) responsible for its
continued acquisition is destroyed. In the first case the target is, in effect,
removed from the battlefield and the population of combatants which are
available to be acquired is reduced. The second case removes the sensor,
however, the target may subsequently be re-acquired by the remaining sensors.
• Time - the failure to take timely action against a target or to re-confirmed the
acquisition of a target may cause the loss of acquisition. As an example, field
artillery units generally consider a target to be acquired even if a sensor is not
currently monitoring the target. If, however, the targeting information is not
acted upon or the acquisition re-confirmed within a reasonable period of time,
the target is considered lost. It is as if the sensor "forgets" that it has acquired the
target.
The rate at which targets return to the unacquired state would be a function of
the above factors and would have individual components comprised of each. By
modifying a high resolution combat simulation, such as the Simulation of Tactical
Alternative Responses, (STAR), so as to maintain a record of targets returning to the
unacquired state, it would be possible to obtain a numerical estimate for the values of
the individual components. The acquisition-loss coefficient could in-turn be obtained
from the individual components. This would allow the use of a Lanchester-type
formulation to model acquisition in a large scale combat simulation like ALARM.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that the reciprocal of the expected time to acquire
targets is a reasonable choice for the acquisition coefficients of a Lanchester-type
formulation of acquisition in a large scale combat model. Further, numerical estimates
of acquisition coefficients can be arrived at by the method of maximum-likelihood
estimation. The ability to arrive at estimates of acquisition coefficients based on data
generated from high resolution, Monte-Carlo simulations, in which established target
detection models are used, is an important result. Additionally the same technique can
be employed to obtain the acquisition-loss coefficients. The successful implementation
of these techniques will be required in order to use a Lanchester-type formulation for
target acquisition in ALARM.
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VI. THE INTELLIGENCE MODULE AND DECISION-MAKING IN
ALARM
A. A. DECISION-MAKING IN ALARM
The preceding chapters of this thesis have concentrated on developing the
conceptual basis for the Intelligence Module and the related function of target
acquisition. The key to the decision making process in ALARM is the
inter-relationships between the Execution, Planning and Intelligence Modules. This
chapter illustrates the relationships between the modules by presenting an extended,
worked example.
ALARM will use an approach to decision-making which has been referred to by
Kilmer [Ref. 3:p. 11] as "future state decision making" as opposed to "current state
decision making". Current state decision-making focuses on deciding at time, t-, what
actions should be taken at time, t- + t, based on the perceived situation at t-. Future
state decision-making, as an alternative, uses the expected situation at time, t- + t, as
the basis for current decisions. This approach requires algorithms to predict the future
states based on the situation at time, t-, and to forecast how the situation will change
over time. Kilmer has developed a set of exponential functions known as the
Generalized Value System, GVS, which will be used to represent the future states of
battlefield entities in ALARM. The GVS methodology is based on two major premises:
• The value of an entity at a particular point in time to a given hierarchical level is
dependent on how useful the entity is at that time and on the availability of the
entity. Power is the measure of that usefulness. The metric for power in GVS is
called Standard Power Units (STAPOWS).
• The power of an entity that is not ready to execute its assigned mission is
discounted. As the entity moves closer in time to being able to accomplish the
assigned mission its power grows exponentially.
An entity's power is situational and may be classified as:
• Basic Inherent Power (BIP) - the inherent power possessed by an entity at full
strength when it is in position to engage its most likely opponent.
• Adjusted Basic Inherent Power (ABIP) - the BIP of an entity adjusted for the
specific mission and condition of the entity at the present time, t .
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• Predicted Adjusted Inherent Power (PABIP) - the ABIP that an entity is
predicted to have at time, t-, given its current state at time, t
,
where t: ^ t .





) x exp[-L(tr tp)]
(6.2)
where L is assumed to be constant during the period (tD ,tj).
• Situational Inherent power (SIP) - the PABIP of an entity which is adjusted for
availability. For times before an entity is in available to perform its mission it is
the PABIP discounted by an exponential factor. For times after the entity is in
position to accomplish its mission it is the PABIP adjusted for attrition, if
required.
The results of the SIP calculations and the graphs of the SIP curves, which
reflect the predicted power of the entities involved in the battle, are the primary devices
used for future state decision-making as presented in this worked example. In order to
maintain simplicity several assumptions will be made.
• The time used in the example is the simulation clock time and is measured in
hours from t = 0. It will advance in 1 hour steps.
• When a unit is moving its rate of advance is constant. This allows simulation
time to be used in the formulas for determining power.
• Units lose power according to the situation based on the following rate schedule:
a. 0.0 per hour for stationary units not engaged in combat with enemy
forces.
b. .05 per hour for units which are moving but not engaged in combat with
enemy forces.
c. .10 per hour x the number of enemy units which are being fought
for units which are engaged in combat.
A unit's power at any given time can be found by using:
Power(t) - Power^) x exp^t-t^] (6.4)
where L is the the natural logarithm of (1.0 - the loss rate) and t ^ t-.
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For example a unit with an initial power = 100
,
at tQ
= 0,moves for three
hours unopposed and then engages in combat with two enemy units for one hour. The
loss of power is:
power = 100 x exp[(ln.95) x 3] - 85.74 , for t = 3 and
power- =i 85.74 x exp[(ln.80) x 1] = 68.59 , for t = 4 .
• Only ground maneuver units can engage more than one enemy unit
simultaneously. Artillery and attack helicopter units can only engage one enemy
unit at a time.
• There are no synergistic effects as a function of force mix. The power of a
composite unit is merely the sum of the power of each individual component
unit.
• Individual units cannot be split. They must be assigned as a whole to a single
mission.
• Intelligence about enemy activities held by senior units will only be made
available to a subordinate when the enemy unit crosses into the subordinates
area of interest. Information on enemy units outside of a unit's area of interest
cannot be obtained.
Since the purpose of this example is to illustrate the logical relationships between
the Intelligence, Execution and Planning Modules certain functions of each will be
treated as "black boxes". Only the results of target acquisition, attrition and movement,
which are accomplished in the Execution Module, will be reported. Similarly, the
decisions reached in the Planning Module will be implemented without detailing the
methodology by which they were reached. The algorithms by which the intelligence
estimates are arrived at has not been developed. As a consequence predicted enemy
courses of action, which would be generated within the IEP of the Intelligence Module,
are also presented without detailing the actual process.
Finally, as a disclaimer, this example does not preport to reflect correct tactical
doctrine, rather it is contrived in order to present various functions of the Intelligence
Module.
B. A WORKED EXAMPLE
The example will concentrate of the flow of information and the subsequent
decisions within a Blue Armored Brigade.
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1. Scenario
A Blue Armored Brigade is defending an area against an approaching Red
Motorized Rifle Division. The mission of the Blue forces is to prevent the Red forces
from advancing past the rear boundary of the Brigade for the next 12 hours. The
combat entities involved in the battle along with their ABIPs are given in Table 5. The
ABIPs of the Blue forces reflect that they are being employed in a defensive operation.
The advantage accruing to a defending unit is assumed to triple its BIP. A diagram of
the battlefield, showing the Areas of Interest and Influence, is at Figure 6.1. A
cartesian coordinate system is used for reporting and example calculations.
TABLE 5
INITIAL ABIP OF COMBAT UNITS
ENTITY TYPE ABIP
XI Tank. Battalion 3000
X2 Tank Battalion 3000
X3 Tank Battalion 1000
X4 Attack. Heli. Co. 2400
X5 Field Artillerv Btry. 1800
YI Motorized Rifle Reg. 2100
Y2 Motorized Rifle Reg. 2100
Y3 Motorized Rifle Reg. 3000
Y4 Tank. Regiment 3600
2. Initial Situation, t =
The position of the forces at time, t- = 0, is shown in Figure 6.2a. Red
Regiments Yl and Y2 have just finished fighting the Blue Divisions covering force and
are in the process of resupplying and reorganizing. Red Regiments Y3 and Y4 are
about to enter the Blue Brigade's area of interest. The Red plan calls for Y3 to
conduct a supporting attack in Blue sector 1 at t = 3 while Y4 attacks in Blue sector 2
at t = 2 . After resupplying Yl and Y2 will also attack in sector 2 at t = 4 in an
attempt to overwhelm the defending forces (the attack time is the time at which the
attacking force reaches the Blue Brigade's area of influence).
The Blue Brigade has deployed its subordinate units so that XI is defending in
sector 1 and X2 is defending in sector 2. X3 is the Brigade's reserve and is positioned
so that it can move to reinforce either XI or X2 within one hour. The initial Blue plan
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Figure 6. 1 Diagram of Battlefield.
calls for X4, the attack, helicopter company, to support XI while X5, the artillery
battery, will be used to support X2. Plots of the true projected SIP curves for the initial
plans of both forces are shown in Figure 6.3. The plots are presented for the Brigade
sector as a whole (Figure 6.3a) and for sectors 1 and 2 separately (Figure 6.3b and c
respectively). Notice that overall the Brigade has the needed combat power to defeat
the Red forces, however, the initial Blue plan does not correctly assign the subordinate
units. Specifically sector 2 does not possess adequate combat power to successfully
oppose the attacking Red forces.
In accordance with the assumptions the Blue Brigade's knowledge about the
Red forces is limited to Yl and Y2 which are located within its area of interest. For the
purposes of this example a shortened version of the target vector, which was
introduced in Chapter III, will be used to present the Blue Brigade's perception of the
Red forces. Specifically the following components will be used:






























Figure 6.2 Situation At t = 0.
I
2
= assigned target number
T = perceived type of unit ,where T = tank and M = motorized
S = number of acquired primary fighting vehicles
Y = perceived ABIP




= projected location at the next time step based on the perceived current
activity (given in cartesian coordinates)
For the initial situation the target vectors are:
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Figure 6.3 Projected Power Curves for Initial Plans.
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Blue intelligence estimates that Yl and Y2 will not be completed resupplying before t
= 3 and that they will attack in sectors 1 and 2, respectively, at t = 4. The Blue
perception of the battlefield at t = is shown in Figure 6.2b. The associated SIP
curves are displayed in Figure 6.4. Based on the these power curves the Planning
Module determines that the currently assigned forces can defeat the projected attacks
in each sector.
3. Situation at t = 1
The position of the forces at time, t = 1, is shown in Figure 6.5a. Red
Regiments Yl and Y2 are continuing to resupply . Red Regiments Y3 and Y4 have
entered the Blue Brigade's area of interest and are advancing to attack in accordance
with the initial Red plan.






The information vector is a subset of the target information vector components where:
• I j
= targets true identity
• T = type of unit
• S = size of unit
• A = activity
• L
x
and L = the reported location in cartesian coordinates .
Following the flow diagram for target aggregation (Figure 3.2) the CIP
sequentially processes each information vector and aggregates or creates new target
vectors as required. For the purposes of the example a standard Red regiment will have
100 primary fighting vehicles. The circular error probable (CEP) associated with the
Blue Brigade's ability to locate a Red regiment is 1.774 and is assumed to be
preportional to the number Red vehicles where:
CEP = 0.01774 x S .
For brevity, only the aggregation tests will be shown for the information
vectors concerning Y3 and Y4 . The level of significance will be set for a = 0.05; the







































































Figure 6.5 Situation at t = 1.
a. Tests on Information Vector Y3.
(1) Type test - a search of the current target vectors reveals a type match with
target 1.
(2) Proximity test
D2 = (15-14)2 + (25-24)2 = 2.0
<J
2
= (1.2418/1.774)2 = 0.49
<r
2
= (0.3548/ 1.774)2 = 0.04
so
T = 2.0/(0.49 + 0.04) = 3.77
For an a = .05 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The
information vector is judged to be a separate report about target 1.
(3) Adjusted Location - the adjusted location of target 1 is calculated
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using:
rj = 70/(70 + 20 ) = 0.78
r
2
= 20/(70 + 20) = 0.22
Sj = 0.7/(0.7 + 0.2) = 0.78
' s2
- 0.2/(0.7 + 0.2) = 0.22
so
X' =[15x(0.78 + 0.22)/2 + 14 x (0.22 + 0.78)/2] = 14.5
Y' =[25x(0.78 + 0.22)/2 + 24 x (0.22 + 0.78)/2] = 24.5
The intermediate target vector is:
(Y1,1,M,70,*,S,14.5,24.5) .
This intermediate target vector is passed to the IEP which predicts the probable
course of action of the enemy unit. Based on this the ABIP and the next
position of the unit are estimated. The final target vector is:
(Y1,1,M ,70,2 100,S, 14.5,24.5)
b. Tests on Information Vector Y4.
A search of the current target vectors fails to reveal a type match with
information vector Y4. A new intermediate target vector is created and passed to the
IEP which returns the final target vector:
(Y4,3,T,30,1000,M,10,17)
This new combat information is reported to the division CI P. The final result




which represent the Blue Brigade's perception of the battlefield.
Using these target vectors the IEP concludes that the new target is a tank
battalion which will be used to locate the defending Blue forces in sector 2 and initiate
the attack; Y2 will follow Y4 and attempt to break-through. The perceived situation is
shown in Figure 6.5b and the corresponding SIP curves in Figure 6.6. Based on the
perceived situation there has been a slight increase in the threat to the Brigade.
However, there still appears to be no difficultly in dealing with the attacks by using the





















Figure 6.6 Perceived Power Curves for t = 1.
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4. Situation at t = 2
The position of the forces at time, t = 2, is shown in Figure 6.7a.. Red
Regiments Yl and Y2 are continuing to resupply . Red Regiments Y3 and Y4 have
entered the Blue Brigade's area of influence and are advancing to attack in accordance































Figure 6.7 Situation at t = 2.







Again, considering only the information vectors for Y3 and Y4, the the target
aggregation procedure is initiated by the CI P. Based on the type test Y3 is tested for
proximity to target vector 1, the closest similar type unit. This produces a test statistic
of T = 94.47, which results in the rejection of the null hypothesis and the creation of
the following intermediate target vector
(Y3,4,M,30,*,A,12,18) .
Similarly a type test for Y4 matches it to target vector 3. The proximity test,
which compares the reported location of Y4 to the estimated location of target 3,
returns a test statistic of T = 2.78, which does not allow the the null hypothesis to be
rejected. The existing target vector 3 is updated to reflect the new combat information.
The intermediate target vector is:
(Y4,3,T,*,A,09,17).
These intermediate target vectors are processed by IEP which returns the
following full set of target vectors which now include the estimated power and next





This new set of target vectors reflect the IEP estimate that target 3 consists of
two tank battalions while target 4 is a motorized rifle battalion. It concluded that Y3
and Y4 will attack in sector 2. There is no change in the forecasted activities of Yl and
Y2. Based on the SIP curves generated by the IEP, the Planning Module uses X5, the
artillery battery, to place long range fires on Y4. The combat information about Y3
and Y4 along with the notification of the initiation of combat action against Y4 is sent
to the division CIP. The Blue Brigade's perception of the battlefield is displayed in
Figure 6.7b.
The SIP curves, which have been adjusted to reflect the use of X5, are shown
in Figure 6.8. Notice that overall the Blue Brigade perceives that it holds a decided
advantage. However, within sector 2 the attacking Red forces will achieve a slight
advantage just before t = 4 which they will maintain throughout the duration of the
battle. The advantage is judged not to be significant and no additional Blue forces are
















Figure 6.8 Perceived Power Curves For t = 2.
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5. Situation at t = 3
The position of the forces at time, t = 3, is shown in Figure 6.9a. Red
Regiments Yl and Y2 have completed resupplying and are moving to the attack. Red
Regiment Y3 has entered the battalion area of interest for sector 1 while Y4 has
entered the area of influence for the battalion in sector 2. Y4 is still under attack by
X5 and has been automatically engaged by X2 when its area of influence was entered.












Using this set of target vectors the IEP estimates that Y4 is a tank regiment
and Y3 is a motorized rifle regiment. The predicted course of action for the Red forces
has Y3 attacking in sector 1 and supported by Yl which will arrive at t = 4. Y4 is
attacking in sector 2 and will be supported by Y2 which is projected to enter the battle





The updated combat information on Y3 and Y4 is send to the division CIP.
Additionally the CIP of XI is notified of the arrival Y3 within its area of interest. The
perceived battlefield situation is shown in Figure 6.9b.
The Planning Module orders X4, the attack helicopter company, to engage
Y3. The perceived SIP curves which result from these modifications in the Blue plan
are at Figure 6.10. The Blue Brigade still believes that it holds an overall advantage for
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Figure 6.9 Situation at t = 3.
increased but is below that of the Blue forces defending in that sector. In sector 2 the
Red forces are still projected to hold a slight advantage. This advantage does not
warrant the commitment of the reserve battalion, X3.
6. Situation at t = 4
The position of the forces at time, t = 4, is shown in Figure 6.11a. Red
Regiments Yl and Y2 have entered the area of interest for sector 2 and are moving to
support Y4 which continues to attack in that sector. Red Regiment Y3 has entered the























Figure 6.10 Perceived Power Curves for t = 3.
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artillery fire while X4 continues to engage Y3. The Blue Brigade's CIP has received the







































Figure 6.11 Situation at t = 4.







The IEP now estimates that the main attack will come in sector 2 and will
consist of Red Regiments Y1,Y2 and Y4. The attack by Y3 will be a supporting attack
designed to prevent XI from maneuvering to assist in sector 2 and to siphon off





The subordinate battalion CIPs are sent the adjusted combat information for their
respective sectors. The Blue Brigade's perception of the battlefield mirrors the true
situation for the first time during the battle.
The SIP curves for t = 4 are shown in Figure 6.12. It is apparent that the
Blue Brigade still has more power than the combined Red forces in the Brigade's
sector. However, the Red forces committed to sector 2 possess significantly more
power than the Blue forces defending it. Without adjustments to the Blue plan the Red
forces will be able to achieve a break-through in sector 2.
The Planning Module commits the reserve battalion, X3, to sector 2 .
Additionally X4 is ordered to support sector 2 by continuing to attack Yl. The
modified battlefield situation is shown in Figure 6.11b and the adjusted SIP curves
sector for this modified plan are displayed in Figure 6.13. Now the power of the Blue
Brigade has been alined so that it is superior to the Red power in both sectors. Based
on these projected power curves the Blue Brigade will be able to prevent the Red forces
from penetrating past the Brigade's rear boundary and therefore successfully complete
its mission.
C. SUMMARY
This example demonstrates the inter-relationships between the Execution,
Intelligence and Planning Modules of ALARM. The key point for the decisioning
making process in the Planning Module and the estimation procedure in the IEP
sub-module of the Intelligence Module is that both the processes are both based on the
perceived situation.
The information which comes from the Execution Module is ground truth. Error







































































































Figure 6.13 Adjusted Perceived Power Curves for t = 4.
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either aggregate or not aggregate target vectors can result in the perception of the
battlefield being distorted from ground truth. Since the intelligence estimate prepared
by the IEP uses the target vectors this can result in an incorrect prediction of the
enemy courses of action. The plans prepared by the Planning Module, which are in
turn based oh the intelligence estimate, may then be faulty and fail to correctly assign
combat assets to cope with the enemy situation.
Subsequent information from the Execution module, as well as intelligence from
senior units and combat information will tend to act as a correcting influence on the
perceived state of the battlefield. The relationships between the modules can therefore
be viewed as dynamic and self-correcting. As more reliable information is made





This thesis has developed the conceptual foundation for the Intelligence Module
of the AIRLAND RESEARCH iMODEL (ALARM). The relationship between the
Execution, Planning and Intelligence Modules has been detailed. Methodologies by
which the Intelligence Module can accomplish required functions were explored. The
following are the key results.
• The Intelligence Module will consist of two sub-modules; the Combat
Information Processor (CIP) and the Intelligence Estimate Processor (IEP).
• Information from the Execution Module will be routed to the appropriate CIP
based on task-force hierarchy.
• The CIP receives raw information from the Execution Module and using the
algorithms developed in Chapter III produces combat information. This combat
information forms the basis for the intelligence estimate and subsequent plans
developed by the Planning Module.
• The IEP will be tasked with developing an intelligence estimate. Specific
functions of the IEP include matching targets to specific organizations in the
enemy's order of battle, predicting the enemy's course of action and preparing
the SIP curves for the enemy forces.
• Decisions will be based on the predicted future state of the enemy forces.
• The Execution Module will produce "ground truth" information, there is no
built-in error. Deviations from ground truth arise because of the decision
algorithms used by the IEP and CIP sub-modules.
• Target acquisition, which is a function of the Execution Module, could possibly
be successfully modelled using a Lanchester-type formulation. The formulation
must include components for acquisition as well as the loss of acquisition.
• The coefficients for a Lanchester-type formulation o^ acquisition could be
obtained by a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The output of high
resolution combat simulations or field trials would be required for the estimation
procedure.
92
In summary, the concept of the Intelligence Module developed in this thesis
provides a basis for future research and study. The development of decision algorithms
for the IEP are dependent on current ongoing projects. The successful completion of
the terrain and avenue of approach models will open the way for future development of
the intelligence estimation process. The required CIP functions are well identified. This
thesis represents only the initial effort in identifying methodologies to accomplish the
required tasks. Finally, Lanchesterian models of acquisition appear to hold great
promise for modeling acquisition in ALARM.
B. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several areas which require future research for the continued
development of the Intelligence Module. The use of decision templates in the
preparation of intelligence estimates needs to be fully explored. The current use of
these templates by intelligence officers is a widespread and accepted practice. They
provide a convenient starting point for developing decision algorithms to identify
enemy organizations and predict their courses of action.
The successful use of a Lanchester-type formulation of acquisition is dependent
upon developing estimates for the process coefficients. This will require either
modifying an existing high resolution combat simulation or creating a new one for the
specific purpose of obtaining times between acquisitions. In order to be applicable to a
wide variety of situations several terrain and force mix scenarios should be explored. A
data base to draw upon must be developed.
Finally, the algorithms used in the CIP must be selected, either from those
presented in this thesis or developed else where. These algorithms should be converted
to computer code and the initial steps of integrating them into ALARM accomplished.
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